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I. BACKGROUND 
To be in line with other jurisdictions1 and to address the gaps in current Scots Law relating to 
third parties’ contractual rights (just quaesitum tertio),2 the Contract (Third Party Rights) Act 
(the Act hereinafter) is introduced to codify third-party common law rights (jus quaesitum 
tertio) in Scotland. According to the Scottish Law Commission (hereinafter the SLC), the 
rigidity of current Scots law lies in the irrevocable nature of just quaesitum tertio in relation 
to third-party rights3 and the consequential “significant barriers” inhibiting the use of third-
party rights in practice.4 The Commission holds the view that the element of certainty would 
be brought into Scots Law when issues such as: transformation from common law rules to 
statutes, prescription, remedies available to third parties in the case of breach 5  and the 
relationship between defences rules and third-party rights,6 are addressed. By removing legal 
uncertainty caused by the ad hoc development of common law, the Act suggests the 
abolishment of the irrevocability rule, the clarifications of the remedies available to third 
parties, the confirmation of the defences rules allowing the parties to avoid obligations 
towards third parties, and the alignment with the contractual prescription rule and procedural 
access to arbitration.7  
 
                                                 
1 SLC Report on Third-Party Rights in Contract, paras 7.18 and 7.33, the jurisdictions mentioned as further 
comparative evidence included Singapore (s 9 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act (Act 39 of 2001)), 
Cayman Islands (s 11 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Law 2014) and Hong Kong (s 12 of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Ordinance (c 623, 2015)) 
2 William McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, (3rd edn Thomson & W Green Edinburgh) 10-17-10-24 
3 SLC Report (n 1) 1.6, 2.18-2.24 
4 Ibid. paras. 5.1-5.3 
5 Ibid. 2.49 and 7.12 
6 Ibid. 2.49 and 7.15 
7 Angus Evan, SPICe Briefing Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Bill, 6 
Procedurally, section 9 of the Act allows a third-party to access the arbitration proceeding 
agreed as the dispute resolution mechanism between the parties. Regarding the procedural 
right to arbitration, the SLC holds the view that the current failure to address third-party 
rights in the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (the AA hereinafter) has left a third-party who is 
offered a substantive right by the parties to a contract but fails to satisfy the requirement of 
privity without a procedural entitlement 8  to join an arbitration or invoke an arbitration 
agreement between the parties to resolve disputes. Consequently, the Act recommends that 
‘contracting parties may provide for disputes with third parties on whom they intend to 
confer an enforceable benefit (a third-party right) to be also subject to arbitration.9 Section 9 
enables the third-party who has been conferred with the benefit of undertaking by the parties 
to the contract defined in section 1 of the Act the right to access arbitration proceedings if 
they want to avoid the courts. The Act also ‘allows them to do so through arbitration 
clauses.’10 Nevertheless, allowing a third-party to exercise or invoke the right to arbitration 
and transforming himself from a person without privity to an arbitration agreement to a third-
party taking part in arbitration proceedings may prompt concerns. The SLC correctly pointed 
out that third-party right would work very well ‘if the contracting parties are content that the 
matter … should be determined by arbitration’,11 nevertheless, due to privity, it would not 
work well if ‘the third-party makes the move which is opposed by one or more of the 
contracting parties.’12 In the case of the latter, ‘the third-party will be confronted with the 
currently insuperable difficulty that it is not party to the arbitration agreement.’ 13  
 
 
                                                 
8 SLC Report (n 1) 7.29 
9 SLC Report (n 1) 7.33 and Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s 9(1) 
10 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee 14 March 2017, Column 20 (per Hector MacQueen) 
11 SLC Report (n 1) 7.29 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
In the SLC’s effort to make provision for a third-party to access arbitration proceedings 
through a third-party substantive right, it overwrites the essence of privity in arbitration and 
rules out the possibility of the parties who may have changed their mind about arbitration. 
During the Parliamentary evidence, Dundas was critical of the confusion between substantive 
rights and the procedural rights in the drafting language. 14  However, the Minister for 
Community Safety and Legal Affairs15 remained unconvinced of the existence of such a 
confusion and claimed “a misunderstanding” 16  whereas the team leader’s willingness to 
consider an amendment led to the removal of section 10 in the second reading.17  
 
This research sets out to examine whether section 9 of the Act interacts well with domestic 
and international arbitration practice on privity. The main considerations of this research are 
the issues of nature of undertaking, privity in arbitration practice and the possible impact on 
the finality of the Scottish awards internationally. The current research will examine the 
above issues from the interactions between the Act, the AA and The Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (herinafter the New York 
Convention). The research will start with a brief introduction of the purpose of the Act. It will 
be followed by a detailed discussion on the issue of privity, definition of party, timing of 
agreeing on arbitration agreement, definition of arbitration agreement and joint liability will 
be examined. Further examination into the right to justice will be carried out from the 
                                                 
14 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee,18 April Column 7; Similar concerns was also raised by the 
English Law Commission which firstly reject the inclusion of arbitration provision but later decided to include it 
in s 8 of the Act. Similar concerns were also expressed by Robert Merkin, Arbitration Law (Informa Law 
Library) 17.49 
15 Annabelle Ewing 
16 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, 25 April column 12, Annabelle Ewing, Minister for 
Community Safety and Legal Affairs; Catriona Marshall, solicitor, Scottish Government legal directorate; and 
Jill Clark, Bill team leader, civil law reform unit, Scottish Government 25 April 
17 Ibid. column12, Annabelle Ewing, Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs; Catriona Marshall, 
solicitor, Scottish Government legal directorate; and Jill Clark, Bill team leader, civil law reform unit, Scottish 
Government 25 April 
perspectives of the third-party and party respectively. The research will be concluded with 
suggestions on how section 9 of the Act would interact better with the AA.  
 
II. FROM SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL RIGHT 
A. Codification Of Substantive Rights - Jus Quaesitum Tertio 
 
Prior to the Act, subject to conditions, a third-party right can be conferred under common law 
rule of jus quaesitum tertio which has existed for many years in Scotland.18 Third-party’s 
right is conferred through the parties’ undertaking which is the one intended by the parties to 
or not to perform some acts for the third-party’s benefit.19 However, McBride pointed out 
that the current development and practice of such a right have to be determined by the 
“construction of the contract”20 in the cases where the ambiguity occurs. Consequently, the 
court may deny a third-party the benefit of suing the parties for breach of contract, despite the 
parties’ intention. The Act was introduced to remedy the issues mentioned above by 
strengthening third-party rights. 
 
The Act is intended to be right based as it expressed no intention to impose reciprocal duty on 
a third-party.21 The codification of the rule of jus quaesitum tertio sees the creation of a third-
party’s statutory independent right to both substantive and procedural claims but with a more 
implicit language. For instance, the wording “in his own right” used in the English version is 
replaced with “a third-party right” throughout section 1 of the Act for the creation of the right 
                                                 
18 Evan, (n 7) 4; it is worth noting that the Scottish Act is to codify the third-party right whereas the English 
version is to create the third-party right. 
19 For instance, s 1(1) prescribes “acquires a third-party right”, s 1(2) defines such right to enforce or invoke the 
undertaking is “a third-party right”, s 1(3) requires possible identification of the person to be conferred the 
‘third-party right’, furthermore, under s 1(4), a party who is not in existence or does not fall into description at 
the time of the contract was constituted may still acquire “a third-party right.” 
20 McBryde (n 2) 10-24 
21 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, ss 1 and 2 
to enforce the undertaking.22 The provision also prescribes both positive undertaking in the 
form of doing something for the person’s benefit23 and negative undertaking24 in the form of 
refraining from doing something for the person. 
 
Apart from codification, section 3(1) of the Act also intends to remove the current 
irrevocability in jus quaesitum tertio.25 The draftsmen intend to mitigate the harshness of 
common law of jus quaesitum tertio by offering the party or the parties to the contact the 
freedom to revoke or modify the undertaking. This freedom corresponds with section 2(4)(a) 
of the Act on cancellation and modification. On the same token, such freedom is also 
recognised in section 3(2) which actively allows the party or the parties to the contract to 
declare non-possibility of cancellation and modification in a third-party right. However, the 
irrevocability is subject to the reliance exception discussed in the later section. 
 
Agreeing with the view that current practice of third-party rights was ‘real or potential issues 
for arbitration’,26 the justification of the inclusion of section 9 of the Act is introduced by the 
SLC. Such a justification is further agreed by practitioners27 who prefer the use of the same 
dispute resolution forum when an arbitration agreement is embedded in the main contract 
which offers a third-party the right to a substantive claim. Modelled on section 8 of the 
                                                 
22 Ibid. s 1(2); Section 1 of the Act used “a third-party right” throughout the provision to create his right to 
enforce the undertaking22 that one or more of the contracting parties will or will not perform some acts for the 
third-party’s benefit which was intended by the parties. For instance, section 1(1) prescribes the condition of the 
acquirement of “a third-party right”, section 1(2) defines such right to enforce or invoke the undertaking is “a 
third-party right”, and identification of the third-party or ascertainment of a non-existing third-party is 
prescribed in sections 1(3) and 1(4) respectively. 
23 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s1(1)(a) and s 2(5) 
24 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s1(1)(b) and s 2(6)(a)-(b) 
25 Carmichael v Carmichael ‘s Executrix 1920 SC (HL) 195 
26 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, 14 March (n 10) column 20 
27 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, 21 March, column 28, Karen Fountain, Karen Manning, 
Jonathan Gaskell and Kenneth Rose. Although Craig Connal view share such a view, he highlighted the fact that 
arbitration is usually not the first port of call in disputes involving modern construction contracts. (28 March 
Column 34) 
English Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 199928 which was viewed by the SLC as the 
English solution working out the third–party right subject to arbitral enforcement,29 the SLC 
followed suit and included the arbitration agreements and jurisdiction agreements in section 9 
of the Act. Further aided by section 9 on arbitration, both provisions create a transformation 
of third-party’s substantive right into a potential joint duty or independent procedural right. 
However, such a preference was questioned by the concerns over privity and the rarity of 
arbitration practice where ‘third parties suddenly appear, acquire rights under a contract and 
therefore acquire rights to arbitration or obligation to arbitrate.’30  
 
B. Creation Of The Procedural Right - Privity In Arbitration 
 
Section 9 offers a third-party the procedural right to arbitration. To do so, privity which is 
viewed as the core element of jurisdiction in arbitration31 has to be removed to allow the 
third-party to enforce or invoke the right.32 Allowing a third-party who is not a party to the 
original arbitration agreement to be engaged in arbitration raises the issues of: privity, 
jurisdiction, definition of party, timing of agreeing on arbitration agreement, definition of 
arbitration agreement and joint liability. All these concerns require a further detailed 
examination from the interaction between the Act and the AA. In this section, the 
examination will focus on the definition of “party” and “third-party”, the nature of a third-
                                                 
28 Although the English Law Commission (hereinafter the ELC) pointed out that the rationale of the 1999 Act is 
to be in line with Scots Law. The ELC also expressed the negative view prior to the inclusion of s 8 of the Act. 
See generally, The Law Commission (LAW Com 242), Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third 
Parties, Item 1 of the Sixth Programme of the Law Reform: The Law of Contract (1996), 
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/lc242_privity-of-contract-contracts-for-the-benefit-
of-third-parties.pdf> 
29 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, 14 March 2017, Column 20 (n 10), per MacQueen 
30 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, 18 April Column 6 (n 14), per Dundas. 
31 It was described as “physical power” by Justice Holmes in McDonald v Mabee, 243 US 90, 91 (1915) or 
“legitimate authority” in Evan Tsen Lee, 'The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction' (2003) 54 Hastings LJ 1613, 
1620. Lord Justice Kerr, 'Arbitration and the Courts - the UNCITRAL Model Law' (1984) 50 Arbitration 3, 15, 
where avoiding “waste of time and costs” was mentioned. 
32 Merkin, (n 14) 17.1, though, he also highlighted the changes brought in by the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 (c 31) in his discussion on Northern Regional Health Authority v Derek Crouch Construction 
Co Ltd. [1984] 2 All ER 175 
party’s right to arbitration ( based on a right or obligation), the effects of subsequent addition 
or withdrawal of arbitration, the interaction between the interpretation of arbitration 
agreement and the conferring of the third-party right under s 9(3), the action required by the 
third-party in the submission of dispute to arbitration under s 9(4) and how the Act would 
work with the international framework which is still dominated by privity.33  
 
1. Section 9 In General 
According to section 9, providing that there is an arbitration agreement between the parties’ 
contract34 which provides an undertaking benefitting a third-party, the third-party would have 
the right and /or duty retrospectively to submit the dispute to arbitration or apply to the court 
to sist (suspension of the legal proceedings) or suspend the court proceedings as if he were a 
party to the arbitration agreement.35 This overwrites the concept of privity of arbitration 
agreement and endeavours to place the third-party on the same level as the parties by 
deeming him as a party to the arbitration agreement under s 9(1). Under this section, the 
third-party is allowed to exercise his third-party rights to enter into an arbitration to claim 
substantive rights based on the undertaking.36 To allow the third-party to resolve disputes 
over a third-party substantive right arising from the undertaking of the contract between the 
parties, two conditions must be fulfilled before a third-party can exercise such a right; namely, 
there is a dispute concerning an undertaking in favour of the third-party and arbitration is 
specified as the means of dispute resolution.37   
 
                                                 
33 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (2006) Cambridge 
University Press 262; Zheng Sophia Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International 
Commercial Law (Routledge 2014) 1-3. 
34 Explanatory Notes, para 36 
35 Ibid, para 37 
36 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s 1(1)(a) 
37 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s 9(2)(a) and (b) 
Beyond section 9(1), sections 9(2) and (3) provide two legal bases for arbitrating the disputes 
involving third-party rights. Section 9(2) provides a mechanism based on contractual claims 
whereas the settlement of non-contractual claims is provided in section 9(3). Section 9(2) 
applies to a dispute concerning a substantive third-party right arising from the main contract 
which requires contractual disputes, including disputes about the right in the third-party‘s 
favour, to be submitted to arbitration. According to the Explanatory Notes,38 this provision 
intends to cover most cases, such as those arising from the situations where the third-party 
has a right to be indemnified by a contracting party against claims for which the third-party is 
found liable. Under this provision, the third-party must submit the dispute to arbitration if he 
wishes to pursue it. This is an imposition of duty on the third-party. Section 9(2) also 
provides a third-party the defence power to apply to the court for a sist to enforce the 
arbitration agreement against the main parties if a contracting party raises a court action 
against the third-party. However, section 9(2) offers the third-party not only a right to enforce 
or invoke the arbitration agreement but also a duty to resolve disputes by arbitration.  
 
Section 9(3) provides a third-party an independent right to pursue non-contractual disputes 
related to the main contract, e.g. a delict brought by or against a party to an arbitration 
agreement, where a third-party is conferred with the similar right to enforce the arbitration 
agreement or seek a sist from the court. According to the provision, based on the independent 
and non-contractual right, the third-party has the right to exercise his option (but not the 
obligation) of submitting the dispute to arbitration or seeking a sist in respect of a court 
action raised against it.39  
 
C. Confusion Between Substantive And Procedural Rights 
                                                 
38 Explanatory Notes, para 37. 
39 Evan, (n7) 11 
 In terms of substantive rights, there are positive undertakings in the form of doing something 
for the person’s benefit40 and negative undertakings41 in the form of refraining from doing 
something for the person. Dundas was critical of the confusion between substantive rights 
and the procedural rights in the drafting language.42 He proposed the drafting changes made 
by the Faculty of Advocates to be considered.43 However, the Minister Ewing remained 
unconvinced of the existence of such a confusion. She held the view that it was ‘a 
misunderstanding on the part of those who have a problem with the drafting – they might not 
have understood the way in which section 9 sits in the Bill and its interrelationship with other 
sections, …’44 while the Clark, the Bill team leader acknowledge their willingness ‘to 
consider an amendment’.45 In its second reading, though leaving section 10 out of the Bill, 
the draftsmen maintained their position on section 9 of the Bill in terms of third parties’ 
access to procedural right to arbitration through the substantive right. The main amendments 
are carried in section 9(4) and (4A) of the Act where the draftsmen removed the ill-drafted 
section 9(4A) and further tightened up section 9(4) with a more concise provision which now 
reads: ‘For the purpose of subsection (3)(d)(i), the person who has the third-party right is to 
be regarded as having submitted the dispute to arbitration if the person has done whatever a 
party to the agreement would need to do in order to submit the dispute to arbitration.’ They 
also further inserted section 9(4A) which is a succinct version of the removed section 10(2) 
about the issue of renouncement. It reads: ‘A person is not to be regarded as having 
renounced a third-party right to enforce or otherwise invoke an undertaking to resolve a 
dispute by arbitration by bringing legal proceedings in relation to the dispute.’  
                                                 
40 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s 1(1)(a) and s 2(5) 
41 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s1(1)(b) and s 2(6)(a)-(b) 
42 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, 18 April, column 7 (n 14) 
43 Ibid. column 7 
44 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee 25 April, column 12 (n 16) 
45 Ibid. column 12 
 III. ISSUE OF PRIVITY IN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT – SHOULD A 
THIRD-PARTY BE A PARTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT? 
 
A. Privity in international arbitration framework  
The AA is promulgated to modernise the Scottish arbitration law and to attract the users of 
international arbitration to Scotland.46 To bridge Scotland with the international arbitration, 
the enforceability of the Scottish awards cannot be a Pyrrhic victory.47 The Contract (Third 
Party Rights) Act gives a third-party the substantive right48 to access to the procedural right 
to arbitration by regarding the third-party as a party to the arbitration agreement.49 This 
would prompt the question whether section 9 fulfils the conditions required for international 
practice of the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards under the framework of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 
(hereinafter the New York Convention) which currently dominates the enforceability of 
convention awards.  
 
The combined readings of section 9 of the Act and the AA raises concerns of the potential 
unenforceability of awards made in Scotland due to the potential lack of support in other 
national laws.50 Such a caution is warranted as an arbitration agreement between the parties is 
                                                 
46 Luca Radicati Di Brozolo, 'International arbitration and domestic law' in Giuditta Cordero-Moss (ed) 
International Commercial Arbitration: Different Forms and their Features (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
40, 47 where the author has indicated that jurisdictions have started modernisation of their arbitration laws in 
order to become arbitration-attractive seats. 
47 A. Belohlavek, 'The Legal Nature of International Commercial Arbitration and the Effects of Conflicts 
Between Legal Cultures' (2011) 2 Law of Ukraine 27. 
48 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act, s 1(1) 
49 Ibid. section 9(1) 
50 Tang, (n 33), 224. 
based on privity which is carried throughout the international framework51 and the AA. The 
dominating role played by privity is evident in the current international framework of 
enforcement as Articles, II, IV and V of the Convention stipulates. For instance, Article II(2) 
of the Convention requires the arbitration agreement to be signed by the parties;52 a copy of 
the arbitration agreement mentioned in Article II(2) of the Convention is required as evidence 
for the application of recognition and enforcement of foreign awards;53 All these are provided 
to satisfy the requirement of jurisdictional element before the effects of the tribunal’s power 
can reach the parties to the arbitration agreement.54 The recognition or enforcement of an 
award may be refused if a lack of jurisdiction is apparent55 or the agreement referred to in 
Article II is not valid under the law applicable to the parties.56  Furthermore, the issue of 
privity may be examined by the enforcing court under Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention which allows the enforcing court exercise its discretion to set aside an award on 
the ground of breach of public policy which imposes the requirement of privity.57 A strict 
application of the principle of privity by the enforcing court would rule out the participation 
of a third-party and have a direct impact on jurisdictional issues when the parties arrive at the 
point of setting aside, recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 
                                                 
51 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 17; Henry P de Vries, 'International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute 
for National Courts' (1982) 57 Tulane Law Review 42. 
52 The New York Convention, Article II (2) reads: ‘2. The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral 
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or 
telegrams.’ 
53 Ibid. Article IV(1)(b) 
54 Maria Hook, 'Arbitration Agreements and Anational Law: A Question of Intent?' (2011) 28 Journal of 
International Arbitration 175. 
55 Fraser Davidson, Hew, R. Dundas, David Bartos, Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (W. Green 2010) 18-19. 
56 The New York Convention, Article V(1)(a) reads: ‘(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II 
were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law 
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the 
award was made.’ 
57 Horatia Muir Watt, '"Party Autonomy" in international contracts: from the makings of a myth to the 
requirements of global governance' (2010) 6 European Review of Contract Law 250, 254. 
Placing the family holiday example 58  discussed in the Policy Memorandum within the 
international framework, a third-party may find it difficult to enforce the award in his favour 
in a country which upholds the principle of privity or expressly disallows third-party rights in 
engaging in the parties’ arbitration.  Similarly, a party may find himself fighting against 
jurisdictional issue in a foreign court over the enforcement against the third-party. Under 
these circumstances, the finality of the Scottish awards may be called into question on the 
ground of the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction over the third-party. After all, as both Lew59 and 
Paulsson60 pointed out that the contractual nature of arbitration is facilitated and regulated by 
the national legal framework which requires a mutually acceptable agreement that complies 
with the legal requirements between the parties. As a result, international parties will have to 
exercise an extreme caution in their choice of Scotland as the place of arbitration. As a result, 
the Scottish Government’s intention to attract international arbitration to Scotland or indeed 
parties’ attempts to enforce the Scottish arbitral awards in the signatory countries to the New 
York Convention may be affected. To avoid this, it is first essential to examine the definition 
of “party” and “third-party” in order to clarify the jurisdictional issues. 
 
1. Can a third-party be a party? 
 
Section 9(1) of the Act provides that, in relation to a dispute to which section 9(2) or (3) 
applies, the person who is conferred with the third-party right is to be regarded as a party to 
the arbitration agreement. Similar to its English counterpart, the language suggests that once 
the third-party invoke or enforce the arbitration agreement, through sections 1 and 9, this 
third-party will be viewed as a party to the arbitration.  
                                                 
58 The example argued that the Act will be able to allow the family members to sue the tour operator directly, 
rather than through the member who is a signing party to the package holiday contract. 
59 Julian DM Lew, 'Arbitration Agreements: Form and Character' in Petar Sarcevic (ed), Essays on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Graham & Trotman 1989) 51, 52 
60 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2013), 1-2 
 However, this may go against a strict interpretation of the requirement of parties’ direct 
consent which is still currently in place of the arbitration system.61 The references to “parties”, 
“between parties” or “parties otherwise agree” can be observed throughout the Act and the 
Scottish Arbitration Rules (the Rules hereinafter). For instance, all default rules in the Rules 
make rooms for parties to the arbitration agreement to modify or disapply the default rules 
while “between parties” can be noticed in section 1(b) on the founding principles, section 
2(1)(b) on the definition of arbitration, section 8 on mandatory rules, section 19 on the 
binding effects of award between the parties, and section 31(2) of the AA. All these indicate 
that privity in the parties’ consent is an essential feature of the Scottish arbitration law. Based 
on this, privity clearly takes a pro-dominate role in the AA. The Policy Memorandum further 
expressly stated that ‘the arbitration agreement between the parties is fundamental to 
arbitration.’62 At this juncture, s 9 of the Act will have to be drawn into discussion on 
whether the requirement of mutual consent in an arbitration agreement would prohibit a third-
party to exercise his right under section 9 of the Act and the AA. 
 
First of all, it is important to highlight that the AA has always been based on privity. 
According to privity, a third-party’s right to enter into arbitration between other parties is 
currently not considered. This is because arbitration is argued for its contractual character 
that originates in the parties’ arbitration agreement. Such a voluntary nature in arbitration 
agreement was succinctly asserted by Kellor who stated: 
                                                 
61 George A. Bermann, 'The "Gateway" Problem in International Commercial Arbitration' (2012) 37 The Yale 
Journal of International Law 1, 2, where the author argued: ‘its use is predicated on the consent of the parties’ 
62 Policy Memorandum accompanied the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, para 69; Jonatan Mance, ‘Arbitration: 
a Law unto itself?’ (2016) 32 Arbitration International 223, 224; Hiro N Aragaki, ‘Does Rigorously Enforcing 
Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?’ (2016) 91 Indiana Law Journal 1143, 1146; Thomas E 
Carbonneau, 'The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements' (2003) 36 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 1189, 1195 
Arbitration is wholly voluntary in character. The contract of which the arbitration 
clause in a part is a voluntary agreement. No law requires the parties to make such a 
contract, nor does it give one party power to impose it on another. When such an 
arbitration agreement is made part of the principal contract, the parties voluntarily 
forgo established rights in favour of what they deem to be the greater advantages of 
arbitration.63 
 
Based on privity and the voluntary nature of arbitration, party autonomy is well recognised in 
the international instruments and arbitration rules, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law,64 the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the ICC Arbitration Rules, The LCIA Arbitration Rules and 
other authorities. For instance, Lew stated: ‘[t]he agreement to submit disputes to arbitration 
is governed by two intertwining principles: party autonomy and the contractual nature of the 
agreement.’65 In Scotland, party autonomy is set as one of the founding principles provided in 
section 1 of the AA. 66 However, the effect of an arbitration agreement affects only the parties 
who are directly involved in the agreement.  
 
The SLC Report on the Act argued against the significant importance of the direct consent in 
arbitration. In the report, The SLC relies heavily on Steingruber 67  and Brekoulakis who 
invoked the concept of ‘third-party beneficiaries of rights under a contract’ to ‘address multi-
                                                 
63 F Kellor, Arbitration in Action, quoted by P Stone, ‘Paradox in the theory of commercial arbitration (1966) 
Arb J 156, 156 and J Lew, Applicable Laws in International Commercial Arbitration (1978) 55 
64 Norbert Horn, 'The arbitration agreement in light of case law of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Arts 7 and 8) 
(2005) 8 International Arbitration Law Review 146; Gerold Herrmann, 'Introductory Note on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration' (1985) 1 Uniform Law Review os 285, 291-293. 
65 Lew (n 59) 51; Mia Louise Livingstone, 'Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Popular 
Fallacy or Proven Fact' (2008) 25 Journal of International Arbitration 529, 530. 
66 Joanna Dingwall, 'International Arbitration in Scotland: A Bold New Future' (2010) 13 International 
Arbitration Review 138, 140. 
67 A M Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (OUP 2012) Chapter 9 
party, and indeed multi-contract relations in international arbitration’,68 where Brekoulakis 
further argued for third-party’s “automatic entitlement” to enforce the arbitration agreement 
once his third-party substantive right is established.69  
 
Following this, in order to link the Act with the existing Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, 
section 9(5) provides the definitions of arbitration agreement and dispute by referring to 
sections 2 and 4 of the AA.70 However, a direct application of section 9 of the Act would 
require a wider interpretation of “party” provided in the AA. This is because the wording of 
“third-party” used in the AA means any parties apart from the direct parties to the arbitration 
agreement. This is rather different from the one provided in the Act which deems the third 
party as a party. Hence, it is necessary to examine the issues of definitions of “third-party” 
and “party” and whether a third-party can be a party under both the AA and the Act. 
 
2. Does “third-party’ mean the same thing in both the AA and the Act? - A clarification 
and a wider definition is required 
 
 
According to section 2(1) of the AA, “party” means a party to an arbitration without other 
further qualification. If one takes international arbitration consensus into consideration, 
“party” is the person who has positively waived his right to resolve dispute in courts and 
                                                 
68 SLC Report (n 1) 7.9; Ibid, paras 9.26-9.28 The SLC also cited the example of “string contracts”, discussed in 
F Davidson, Arbitration (2nd ed, 2012), para 13.08. 
69 S Brekoulakis, Third Parties in International Commercial Arbitration (2010), paras 2.143-2.163; Stavros L. 
Brekoulakis, ‘Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v Commercial Reality’ in Stavros L. Brekoulakis, 
Julian D.M. Lew et al (eds) The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 
2016) Chapter 8, paras 8.35-8.43. The SLC also relied on the English proposition on the third –party being 
bound by the agreement and constrained to pursue arbitration, US practice of estoppel, French and Chilean court 
judgements. paras 7.12-7.13 
70 Explanatory Notes accompanied the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, para 39 
opted for arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism.71  The term “party” can be seen in 
the AA and the Rules in relation to parties’ exercise of their autonomy in deciding the matters 
related to arbitration proceedings. For instance, section 6 of the AA mentioned “the parties” 
to an arbitration agreement in the determination of the law governing arbitration agreement 
and s 9 sets out the parties’ power in modifying or applying default rules.  
 
Meanwhile, the reference to a “third-party” in the AA and the Rules means any person who is 
not the direct parties to the arbitration agreement, but for some reason is involved in 
arbitration proceedings. For instance, the issue of the lack of tribunal’s jurisdiction over a 
person who is not the party to the arbitration agreement discussed in sections 12(3) or 20(2)(b) 
and (3)(c) of the AA in an enforcement of a Scottish or international award respectively as 
well as rule 67 in the case of challenge of an award on the issue of substantive jurisdiction. 
“Third-party” is also highlighted in rule 26(2) which requires the tribunal and the parties to 
take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised disclosure of confidential information defined 
in rule 26(1) by any “third-party” involved in the conduct of the arbitration.  
 
The different meanings of parties and third-party in both the Act and the AA prompted the 
SLC to search the Explanatory Notes to the AA for a possible wider definition of “party”. It 
found no further clarification whether a third-party can be deemed as a “party to an 
arbitration” defined in section 2 of the AA.72 Despite the SLC’s acknowledgement that no 
comment was offered on this issue, it positively assumed that the term “party” ‘must be wider 
in scope than “parties to the arbitration agreement” because the AA elsewhere refers to the 
possibility of parties to the arbitration being persons claiming “through or under a party to the 
                                                 
71 Henry P de Vries, 'International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts' (1982) 
57 Tulane Law Review 42, 43; Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2008) 17. 
72 Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, s 2. 
arbitration agreement”. 73   Therefore, the SLC held the view that ‘the 2010 Act thus 
deliberately leaves open the possibility that persons not privy to the arbitration agreement 
might nonetheless become parties to the arbitration under the agreement.’74 Once the link 
between the AA and the Act was created, the discussion above would be able to create a 
platform which clearly demonstrated that privity is no longer an essential element in a third-
party’s access to arbitration according to sections 1 and 9 of the Act. The SLC was able to 
use its idea of “party claim under the right” as its justification to bring a third-party into the 
arbitration proceedings.  
 
Nevertheless, the researcher is of the view that amendments to the definition of party in 
section 2 of the AA will provide opportunity for the applications of s 31(2) of the Act and s 9 
of the Act. Currently, section 31(2) reads: ‘[t]his Act applies in relation to arbitrations and 
disputes between three or more parties as it applies in relation to arbitrations and disputes 
between two parties (with references to both parties being read in such cases as references to 
all the parties).’ However, this provision refers to multi-party arbitration provided in rule 40 
of the Rules where all parties’ consent is required. However, an amendment to section 2 of 
the AA linked to the Act will afford the legal basis for third-party’s right to arbitration under 
s 9 of the Act.  
 
 
Over and above, the definition of “party” is significantly linked to rule 1 of the Rules. It is 
commonly accepted that a party to an arbitration agreement can give the other party notice 
submitting a dispute to arbitration in accordance with the agreement. Access to arbitration 
                                                 
73 Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, ss 10 and 11.  See also Rule 1 of the Scottish Arbitration Rules. It reads: “An 
arbitration begins when a party to an arbitration agreement (or any person claiming through or under such a 
party) gives the other party notice submitting a dispute to arbitration in accordance with the agreement.”  For 
discussion of the equivalent phrase in s 82(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (England & Wales) see T Molloy QC 
and T Graham, “Arbitration of trust and estate disputes” (2012) 18(4) Trusts and Trustees 279, 282-286. 
74 SLC Report (n 1) 7.24 
proceeding would only work if the third-party is clearly defined in both instruments as “party” 
to satisfy the requirement of privity. If a third-party is confronted with the ‘currently 
insuperable difficulty’ 75  of privity, it would have no legal entitlement to commence 
arbitration under rule 1 of the Scottish Arbitration Rules. However, it is also worth noting 
that the initiation of the arbitration process can also be carried out by ‘any person claiming 
through or under such a party’ who is the direct party to the arbitration agreement. The claim 
through or under such a party is thought to be the claim of a substantive right. Linking such 
an interpretation with s 1 of the Act, a third-party who has been conferred would have the 
right to the arbitration process where he was not a party to it.  
 
To eliminate any possible confusion between “party” and “third-party” arising from the Act 
and the AA, the researcher urges the draftsmen to consider to propose an amendment to 
widen the definition of “party” given in s 2 of the AA to include a cross-reference to sections 
1 and 9 of the Act, by adding wording such as “party means a party to arbitration, including a 
third-party defined in Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act”. Furthermore, an 
amendment to the term of “third-party” mentioned in rule 26(2) should also be addressed as 
third-party in this rule can mean lawyers, witnesses or expert witnesses. Similarly, in the 
provision related to appointment referees, the use of “third-party” indicates a third-party who 
is delegated with the power to appoint the arbitrators and has the legal status of assuming the 
role of a party.76 Such an amendment will allow the third-party to assume the role of a party 
to the contract and avoid the difficulties arising from the debates over consent. Further 
amendment may also be required to be made to sections 1(1), 11, 8 and 13 of the AA for 
clarification purposes. Once a wider definition is provided, a third-party will not encounter 
“currently insuperable difficulty” but will be viewed as a party who would fulfil the 
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jurisdictional requirement stipulated in Articles V(1)(a) and V(2)(b) of the NYC in those 
jurisdictions recognise a third-party right.  
 
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, no such cross reference was made to the Act and the 
AA at the all stages of legislation. Instead, the Act sought a clarification within the Act itself 
and merely provided that: “For the purpose of subsection (3)(d)(i), the person who has the 
third-party right is to be regarded as having submitted the dispute to arbitration if the person 
has done whatever a party to the agreement would need to do in order to submit the dispute to 
arbitration.”   
3. Party’s right – contractual / non-contractual right, future / retrospective right, 
dependent /independent right 
 
Being a party to the arbitration agreement, the party has a contractual right to commence 
arbitration according to rule 1 of the Scottish Arbitration Rules. Before exercising such a 
right, the party concerned must prove that he is the party to the arbitration agreement to 
submit a present or future dispute to arbitration as discussed above. For a third-party to 
invoke his right to arbitration under section 9(2) of the Act, his identity must be named or 
established in the contract 77  to allow his procedural access to arbitration to claim his 
substantive contractual right defined in section 2 of the AA. For a present dispute, such fact is 
easier to be established, ‘there is no difficulty where contracting parties and a third-party are 
already in dispute about a third-party right said to arise from the contract’78.  In the case of a 
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future dispute,79  the Act offers the parties to name or provide sufficient information to 
establish the identity of the third parties80 whom they wish to benefit from the conferred right 
under s 1 of the Act.  In the case of a future dispute, difficulty may arise when one of the 
parties challenge the identity of the third-party who makes a claim to a substantive right 
under the contract or not or applies to the court for a sist. In the event of a successful 
challenge, the “third-party” is not party to the arbitration agreement via sections 1 and 9, 
consequently, it has not entitlement to commence arbitration according to rule 1 of the AA.  
 
The other issue related to the Act is the types of dispute which are allowed to be submitted to 
arbitration. Section 2 of the AA defines the dispute as “contractual or not”. This opens the 
door for no contractual disputes to be submitted to arbitration. As discussed, the submission 
of a contractual claim falls into the scope of section 9(2) of the Act, whereas the submission 
of a non-contractual dispute demands the application of section 9(3) of the Act which 
provides a third-party with an independent procedural right to arbitration for both present and 
future disputes. 
 
It is also worth noting that, according to the Explanatory Notes, section 2 allows the third-
party substantive right to be a future or conditional right but not a retrospective right. For 
instance, it stated that the undertaking referred in section 1(2) of the Act can be dependent 
upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of a future event as discussed. Equally, the third-party 
right can also be established, enforced, invoked once a condition is fulfilled. The background 
of this provision is linked to general Scottish contract law which allows the existence or 
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resolution81 of a right to be suspended or pending upon the occurrence of an event which may 
or may not happen.82 
 
A further issue which one has to consider is whether the conferring of a third-party right is to 
create a dependent right upon the original right-holder, and subsequently being transferred 
into an independent right when the third-party elects to exercise the right or a person comes 
into existence or answering the relevant description.83 According to the SLC’s interpretation 
of Love v Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers of Great Britain and Ireland,84 the 
SLC seems to suggest that the third-party right comes into existence when it was given but 
such a right is only ‘suspended until the condition is met.’85 Once the condition is met the 
third-party should be able to exercise his right. Such an analysis seems to indicate that the 
SLC intends to offer an independent third-party right which may be an active right or a 
suspended or resolutive right. If this is the case, it can be assumed that the SLC intends to 
create dual independent substantive rights for the parties and the third-party who can exercise 
their rights individually. However, the reading of proposed provisions seems to suggest 
otherwise. In the Act, the SLC proposes that, subject to sections 4, 5 and 6, the creation of 
third-party right can be cancelled or modified by the contracting parties.86 If a cancellation or 
modification is allowed, a third-party’s right is only a conditional independent right because 
it would be affected by the original right holder’s power to modify or withdraw.  
 
However, the answer may be different in terms of a third-party’s procedural right. Due to the 
principle of separability which allows an arbitration agreement to be detached from a void 
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main contract.87 Unless the third-party right is cancelled by the original right-holder, a third-
party would be required to exercise his independent procedural right to apply for a sist or 
have access to arbitration88 in order to pursue a substantive contractual claim against one of 
the parties or respond to the claim against him brought by one of the parties. Furthermore, a 
third-party can always exercise his independent right to pursue a settlement of a non-
contractual dispute in arbitration or court.89  
 
4. A third-party’s duty or right to arbitration?  
 
Although it appears that a third-party is offered a right to arbitration, it is worthwhile 
highlighting that a third-party’s right to pursue arbitration is in fact both a right and 
corresponding duty to engage in arbitration according to the language of section 9(2) of the 
Act and the Explanatory Notes. In the event of a contractual dispute, a third-party’s 
corresponding duty lies in the only choice available to him to respond to a claim against him 
through arbitration. At the same time, the SLC adopted the “third-party right to arbitrate” by 
offering a third-party active /defending right to seek a sist if a court action was brought 
against him when the main contract contains an arbitration agreement. In contrast to the 
prescribed method of dispute resolution for contractual disputes, section 9(3) of the Act was 
encouraged by Brekoulakis’ view on the “benefit conditional on arbitral enforcement” where 
a third-party is not imposed upon the duty to arbitration, where he argued that ‘[t]his 
effectively means that if, but only if, the third-party beneficiary chooses to exercise the 
substantive benefit offered to it, it will be bound by the arbitration clause contained in the 
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main contract.’90  Consequently, a third-party is given the choice to pursue a non-contractual 
claim in court or arbitration under section 9(3). 91 Section 9(3) is designed to deal with the 
situation where the third-party does not have a substantive right under the contract but might 
otherwise have a procedural right to invoke the arbitration agreement.92 It was pointed out 
that the purpose of this section is broadly in line with international trend in relation to moving 
away from privity for the purposes of arbitration.93  
 
5. Forcing the parties to return to arbitration? 
 
For any dispute arising from a non-contractual dispute but related to the main contract, 
section 9(3) of the Act provides the third-party with an independent right to resolve the 
disputes by arbitration. The draftsmen used the term ‘a right created outwith the bounds of 
the contract’.94  For example, the third-party is given an ‘option’95  to choose whether to 
submit the dispute to arbitration or not; such as a delictual dispute arose from the construction 
contract.  It is important to point out that this is a right, not an obligation imposed upon the 
third-party. Apart from the two conditions listed in section 9(2), a third-party has the right to 
enforce or otherwise invoke the agreement in relation to the matter under dispute, moreover, 
the third-party has already submitted the dispute to arbitration or sought to sist the legal 
proceedings by asking the courts to decline the jurisdiction based on the existence of an 
arbitration agreement. A third-party with the right can also be presumed to have exercised the 
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right under section 9(3)(d)(i) if he ‘has done whatever a party to the agreement would need to 
do in order to submit the dispute to arbitration.’96 
 
Leaving privity aside, given such a choice, what a third-party will do is to bring a party or 
both parties to the forum of his choice. The SLC specifically pointed out that this entitlement 
is not an obligation but a choice.97 Suppose the parties chose to elect their contractual right to 
resolve their contractual disputes by arbitration, under the proposed provision, the party or 
parties can still be brought back to the court to resolve non-contractual disputes by the third-
party. Such an undesirable scenario can also occur in the situations where parties elect an 
amiable settlement and choose not to commence arbitration under rule 1 of the Rules or 
where the parties jointly denounced the arbitration agreement and choose court as the forum 
but being brought back to arbitration with the third-party. 
 
IV. DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THIRD-PARTY’S DENUNCIATION OF 
THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT 
 
During its first reading, the Act suggested that, though the parties can confer the third-party 
an undertaking, the third-party does not have to accept it. The third-party could denunciate 
the substantive right either expressly or impliedly according to section 10(1). Interestingly, 
section 10(2) of the Act stipulated that, with the existence of an arbitration agreement in the 
contract, third-party’s rights to arbitrate under section 9(2) and (3) remains. This provision 
seemed to be unnecessary as the autonomy of arbitration agreement would require the court 
to sist the court proceedings raised by the parties, includes a third-party who is deemed to be 
a party, to the agreement.  
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 However, what if the parties did not seek a sist in the court proceedings raised by the third-
party, does this indicate that the parties and third-party denounce the arbitration agreement? 
To operate section 10, the most important consideration is that the party to the legal 
proceedings has to made an application to the court98 to enable the court to exercise its power 
to sist the proceedings.99 The reading of the provisions seems to suggest that the parties are 
bound by the arbitration agreement whilst the third-party has a cherry-picking approach in 
terms of dispute resolution. However, a further issue may arise if the parties neither take any 
steps prescribed in the Act nor seek a sist in the court proceedings raised by the third-party. 
Does this indicate that both the parties and third-party denounce the arbitration agreement? If 
so, would the court be able to, on its own initiative, decline its jurisdiction and refer the 
parties back to arbitration as if the arbitration agreement was not renounced by actions? The 
researcher is of the view that the court should refer all parties to arbitration related to section 
9(2) which is based on a duty, whereas the scope for parties’ joint denunciation of arbitration 
may be available in the case of section 9(3) which is based on an option. Although the 
draftsmen had a second thought on section 10, they remained unchanged on the issue of 
renunciation by moving section 10(2) into section 9(4A) in the second reading which made 
its way through the final reading.100  
 
V. ISSUES OF CONSENT, ORAL AND IMPLIED AGREEMENT? 
 
In relation to concerns over non-enforceability of the Scottish awards in the countries where a 
third-party procedural right is not allowed, one may suggest the removal of section 9 of the 
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Act. Other suggestions include the requirement of a third-party’ signature and parties’ 
consent, however, they could only be sustained in the case of a present dispute and the third-
party’s awareness of the conferred right. For a future dispute or a third-party whose identity 
needs to be ascertained or who is unaware of the right may require further consideration. In 
any case, a third-party should not be compelled to sign the arbitration agreement as this 
would be breach the voluntary nature of arbitration and further impact upon the validity of 
the arbitration agreement. 
 
These concerns can also be examined from the issues of written requirement and implied 
agreement. For the written requirement, Section 1 of the Act provides that the third-party 
right does not have to be in the written form. This is to underpin the general Scots contract 
law which recognises both written and verbal agreements.101 That an undertaking can be 
expressed in writing in a contract or orally between the parties to the contract is also reflected 
in section 4 of the AA which allows oral arbitration agreements.  
 
However, an oral arbitration agreement comes with its own set of problems at the stage of 
enforcement of NYC awards.102 To enforce a NYC award in a signatory country to the New 
York Convention and in Scotland under section 21 of the AA or enforce a Scottish award in a 
New York Convention country, the original or a duly certified copy of arbitration agreement 
is required to be submitted as evidence when seeking enforcement.103 In the case of an oral 
arbitration agreement, difficulties may arise from the burden of proof. Under these 
circumstance, the SLC may wish to consider to amend section 21 of the AA which currently 
                                                 
101 Hew R Dundas, ‘The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010: Converting Revision into Reality’ (2010) 76 
Arbitration 2, 13. 
102  See generally about the difficulties with oral agreement raised in H Yu, ‘Written Arbitration Agreements – 
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requires the original or a duly certified copy of the award as the key evidence to be produced 
to the Scottish courts by the winning party for enforcement.  
 
It is worth noting that if other enactment or rule of law requires fulfilment of steps to create 
an enforceable obligation then this “necessary step” became essential to the creation of a 
third-party right. For instance, section 1(2) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 
1995, the fulfilment of writing requirements in the constitution of a contract or unilateral 
obligation for the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of an interest in land 104  or 
otherwise than by the operation of a court decree, enactment or rule of law,105 a gratuitous 
unilateral obligation,106 a trust whereby a person declares himself to be sole trustee of his 
own property or any property which he may acquire,107 will, testamentary trust disposition 
and settlement or codicil.108  
 
Section 2(3) of the Act allows both express and implied creation of the undertaking to give 
rise to a third-party right. However, difficulties may arise when the parties disagree over the 
contents of an implied undertaking. Further difficulties can also occur in the case where the 
parties or the parties to the main contract unintentionally created such an undertaking. This 
would create further issues in the interpretation of the validity of arbitration agreement. 
Hence, an express creation of the undertaking would provide legal certainty in the 
researcher’s view.  
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VI. “RELIANCE” AND RIGHT TO JUSTICE - THIRD-PARTY’S 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNDERTAKING IS NOT A REQUIREMENT 
AND HIS RIGHT TO JUSTICE 
 
Section 2(4) of the Act does not require third-party’s knowledge of the creation of the 
undertaking. It highlights that a third-party does not need to be aware of the right existed in 
his benefit as the provision entitles the party to acquire a third-party right to enforce or 
invoke an undertaking even if ‘there has been no delivery, intimation or communication of 
the undertaking to the person.’109 This provision is said to remove any doubt which might 
exist under the current law on jus quaesitum tertio as to whether the creation of a third-party 
right is dependent on  the third-party’s awareness of the undertaking as the draftsmen do not 
view such an awareness or written requirement as ‘a necessary step’110 for the creation of the 
right.111 Following the above-discussion on reliance, one has to enquire how would a third-
party exercise reliance if he is not aware of the undertaking conferred upon him.  
 
This may transpire into the third-party’s loss of right / choice to arbitration. A third parties’ 
inability to exercise reliance112 leads to his loss of right /choice to arbitration, consequently 
places him in a disadvantageous position. In the context of arbitration, under the section 2(4) 
of the Act, a third-party may be able to argue for the loss of access to arbitration due to the 
lack of knowledge of the right.  To avoid this, the researcher calls for an express conferred 
undertaking. The third-party’s awareness of the right will allow space for the management of 
third-party right and dispute resolution under sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It is important to 
point out that revocation is not the main problem in the context of arbitration, but the lack of 
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opportunity of exercise reliance leads to the debates over access to third-party right or justice 
through the loss of his third-party right.  
 
A. Third-Party’s Inability To Exercise Reliance 
In the cases where “reliance” has not been exercised by the third-party, the parties would 
have the contractual right to renounce arbitration. However, if the non-exercise of reliance is 
due to unawareness under s 2(4) of the Act, questions have to be raised such as whether the 
third-party’s right to arbitration would be affected accordingly. Section 2(4) creates a 
situation where a third-party who may not be aware of the right conferred upon him. As 
discussed above, the lack of knowledge of the third-party right will prohibit him from acting 
or not acting in a required way to exercise the reliance exceptions to benefit from the third 
parties right and the procedural right to arbitration. While the third-party’s right to arbitration 
proceeding may be partially or totally affected (modified or cancelled by the parties) before 
he becomes aware of the creation of a right, his right to national court under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (herein after the ECHR) will not be affected as the change of 
dispute resolution mechanism still leave the choice of national courts open to the third-party 
if he wishes to pursue his substantive right once he becomes aware of his right. Consequently, 
the right to justice is maintained under section 2(4) of the Act. 
    
In relation to the right to justice under section 9(2) which require the third-party to resolve 
contractual disputes by means of arbitration which is specified by the parties who had already 
exercised the choice for the third-party. Under these circumstances, a third-party is not given 
the same privileges as those available to the parties at the time of making the choice of 
dispute resolution.   
 
The SLC raised the possibility of third-party’s consent by action113 in the cases where a third-
party seeks a sist in the Scottish court. In the SLC’s very own words:  
The third party cannot be bound to arbitrate (imposition of a duty); but if it chooses to 
invoke the arbitration clause in response to an action against it by a contracting party, 
then the third party by voluntary action becomes party to an arbitration agreement 
between itself and the contracting party or parties.  In terms of article 6(1) ECHR, 
therefore, section 9(2)(b) of the draft Bill appears to be entirely acceptable, as also 
section 8(2) of the 1999 Act.114  
 
The application for a sist is viewed by the SLC as a consent to arbitration by action, 
consequently, the third-party becomes a party to arbitration. Furthermore, a third-party’s 
response to a dispute being raised against it is viewed by the SLC as a defence by action to be 
part of arbitration proceedings. By demanding a third-party to pursue dispute resolution by 
the parties’ choice of arbitration, a question needs to be asked is whether section 9(2) 
breaches third-party’s right to justice. In other words, whether the non-fulfilment of the prior 
consent requirement in arbitration would constitute a breach of Article 6(1) of the ECHR?  
 
In relation to the right exercised under section 9(3) of the Act, a third-party’s right to elect the 
choice of forum will ensure that the Act does not contradict the ECHR. If the third-party 
elects the court, his right to justice is maintained. If arbitration is elected, no right is breached 
because such a choice is made out of different dispute resolution mechanisms available to 
him as well as those arguments discussed in s 2(4) of the Act. For the parties who had already 
expressed their choice of arbitration, the third-party’s choice of arbitration will not breach 
their right to justice because it was based on their own prior choice contained in the main 
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contract. For the parties who managed to change their mind over the dispute resolution 
mechanism, the situation will return to the one discussed under section 2(4) of the Act. Even 
for those parties who failed to exercise their right of revocation to cancel the third parties 
right would not provide the parties with a claim of breach of justice as the law does not 
protect such a failure. 
 
 
B. Third-Party’s Exercise Of Reliance And The Parties 
The emphasis on party autonomy is removed by sections 4-6 which provide the third-party 
the defence against the parties’ modification or cancellation of third-party right. These are 
said to be specific fix to problems that exist in the current common law without taking ‘a 
more holistic approach to all issues.’115 The lack of a holistic approach can also be observed 
in the combined effects of sections 4-6 and 9. Under the Act, the third-party has an 
independent right to pursue arbitration for both contractual and non-contractual disputes. 
Once the “reliance” exception is exercised, the parties is no longer entitled to modify or 
cancel the right, including right to arbitration. However, in the context of arbitration, the 
immediate issue is whether the parties’ lost entitlement of modification or cancellation of the 
right would lead to coercion in the cases where the parties renounced arbitration as the 
dispute resolution mechanism. Supposing, the parties chose not to exercise this right or even 
mutually agree to renounce this right, there should be no reason to force both parties to re-
enter into arbitration proceedings where the parties did not commence or actually wished to 
get out of arbitration. In other words, even with the parties’ renunciation, would the parties be 
forced to return to arbitration and have their right to justice under Article 6(1) ECHR 
breached?  
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 To answer this question, it is essential to examine this issue from two perspectives. One is the 
parties’ choice of arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism and the other is the nature 
of initiation of arbitration. It is commonly agreed that parties’ choice of arbitration does not 
constitute a breach of parties’ right to justice under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.116 This is 
because the parties were afforded the choices of arbitration and national courts before 
arbitration is chosen as the main method of dispute resolution. Furthermore, parties are also 
offered public hearings in the national courts at the later stages of challenge, recognition or 
enforcement of arbitral awards, if any.  
 
 
Examination has to be carried out in terms of the question of whether the initiation of 
arbitration is a right or duty in order to answer the second question. On the face of it, the 
exceptions to the revocation of the third-party rights appears to overturn one’s current 
understanding of privity and party autonomy underpinning arbitration agreements and may 
likely coerse the parties to enter into arbitration after they had changed their mind about their 
previous choice of dispute resolution mechanism.  However, it is commonly accepted that an 
arbitration agreement imposes the parties’ a duty to resolve their disputes by arbitration in the 
eyes of the courts.117 Such a duty corresponds with the contractual right possessed by both 
parties to bind the other party to arbitration. In the cases where “reliance” has been exercised 
by a third-party, both parties would be required by the Act to honour their contractual duty 
based on their original arbitration agreement. Since this arbitration agreement is based on the 
parties’ choice of forum available to them, hence, no breach of right to justice. Both the 
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Explanatory Notes and the Briefing suggest that the premise of this entitlement is based on 
the contracting parties’ mutual wishes to pursue the matter in arbitration and the legal 
consequences of a valid arbitration agreement in relation to a tribunal’s jurisdiction. 118 
Consequently, considering the legal effects of an arbitration agreement, the issue of coercion 
would never arise had the parties not wished to change the dispute resolution mechanism.  
 
However, if the parties did wish to change their previous chosen dispute resolution 
mechanism following a third-party’s “reliance” being exercised, the parties would be 
statutorily barred from exercising their contractual right to do so. This leads to concerns over 
coercion over the parties who are the creators of the contract; more directly, whether such 
coercion would have an impact on the right to justice under Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION – SUGGESTIONS OVER THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
It was correctly put that certainty with regard to the third-party right is essential to the 
success of the Act.119 However, the transformation from substantive right to procedural right 
may create confusion. Leaving this aside, to achieve a full benefit of s 9 of the Act, ideally 
both the Scottish procedural and substantive laws are applied and the enforcement forum is in 
Scotland. However, the success of the Scottish arbitration should not limit itself within its 
own borders. Internationally, the finality of awards holds the key to the success of arbitration 
systems within different jurisdictions. To avoid the SLC’s concerns over the third-parties’ 
access to arbitration being opposed by one or more of the contracting parties,120 ideally, it 
would be an idea to draw a clear distinction between procedural rights and substantive rights. 
As the Act has now passed the final reading before the Scottish Parliament, the draftsmen 
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should now consider the amendments discussed in this paper to provide clarification on 
“parties” and “third-parties” as well as appropriate cross-reference between the AA, the Rules 
and the Act. It is also wise to consider the various difficulties and ambiguities which may 
arise from renunciation which is currently being provided in section 9(4) of the Act. Finally, 
in order to balance the contractual right against the right to justice, the possibility of coercion 
on the parties who have jointly abandoned arbitration as the means of dispute resolution to 
return to arbitration deserves a re-think. 
 
